A New Meio/Ideia poll on the 2026 presidential election. It offers more than just numbers. It offers a rich snapshot of Brazilian society. Within each percentage point lies a layer of collective memory, fear, hope, resentment, religious identity, economic experience, and moral perception of politics.
The dispute between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro appears not merely as a confrontation between two candidates. It emerges as an expression of two national narratives that permeate Brazilian daily life, organize social affections, and shape how millions of people interpret the country, democracy, and the future.
Conducted between May 23 and 27, 2026, with 1.500 telephone interviews across all regions of Brazil, a margin of error of 2,5 percentage points, and a confidence level of 95%, the survey reveals a competitive scenario, but also shows that Lula arrives at the center of the presidential race with significant sociological advantages.
In the spontaneous poll, Lula appears with 33% of voting intentions, while Flávio Bolsonaro registers 18,7%. This data has enormous political significance. The spontaneous poll measures much more than immediate voting intention. It measures symbolic presence in the national consciousness. It measures accumulated historical strength. It measures the ability to remain alive in the popular imagination even without an intense electoral campaign.
Lula remains the only figure in Brazilian politics capable of single-handedly mobilizing an integrated national memory. For millions of Brazilians, his name is associated with the idea of social mobility, consumption, state protection, university inclusion, economic growth, and recognition from the popular classes.
Lulaism doesn't operate merely as a party or ideological current. It functions as a historical experience deeply rooted in the concrete lives of a large part of the Brazilian population.
Flávio Bolsonaro appears to be firmly established as the main electoral heir of Bolsonarism. However, the distance between the two reveals a structural problem within the contemporary Brazilian right. Bolsonarism retains emotional intensity, mobilization capacity, and a strong ideological identity, but still struggles to transcend the limits of its own conservative camp.
There is a silent and extremely revealing piece of data in the spontaneous survey. Jair Bolsonaro still appears with 4,3% of voting intentions. Even outside the institutional center of the dispute, his symbolic capital remains active. This demonstrates that Bolsonarism continues to be a consolidated political identity in contemporary Brazil.
However, symbolically inheriting the Bolsonaro surname does not automatically mean inheriting the same national electoral power.
In the first round of simulated voting, Lula reaches 38,5% against Flávio Bolsonaro's 31,5%. Statistically, this is a consistent lead. Sociologically, the data suggests something even more relevant. Lula maintains a relatively stable electorate even after years of extreme polarization, institutional erosion, and economic tensions. His electoral base remains high.
Flávio Bolsonaro emerges as a competitive opponent, but without managing to break through a decisive barrier. His growth is limited precisely in the social sectors necessary for building a national majority.
The second round makes this even more evident. Lula appears with 46,5% against Flávio Bolsonaro's 41,4%. The advantage is narrow, but significant. For a long time, previous polls showed a constant technical tie between the two. Now Lula opens up a more comfortable lead. In highly polarized contests, five points can represent a huge political advantage.
But the most important numbers emerge when the research delves into social segments.
Flávio Bolsonaro is losing ground precisely where Bolsonarism most needs to grow: among young people, center-right sectors, and higher-income voters.
Among young people aged 16 to 24, Lula surpasses Flávio Bolsonaro. This data has enormous sociological significance. For years, the perception has been consolidated that Brazilian youth were inevitably moving towards a digital conservatism, radicalized by social media and the aggressive aesthetics of the contemporary far right.
Research reveals a more complex scenario. A significant portion of young people are beginning to associate democratic stability, future prospects, educational inclusion, and economic security with the political landscape led by Lula.
The right wing is losing precisely in territory it considered its natural domain.
Another relevant piece of data emerges in income. Flávio Bolsonaro loses competitiveness among Brazilians who earn more than five minimum wages. Historically, this sector tends to function as an important base of Brazilian liberal conservatism.
The erosion in this segment reveals a tarnished image, fatigue with extremist discourse, and a growing difficulty for Bolsonaro's supporters in engaging with moderate sectors of the business community, liberal professionals, and part of the urban middle class.
In the center-right, the problem is also clearly apparent. Flávio maintains control over the established ideological right, but is losing strength among moderates. This is perhaps the main structural limitation of his candidacy.
No Brazilian presidential election is won solely through radicalization. It is necessary to win over intermediate zones of society. And it is precisely in this territory of moderation that Bolsonarism encounters resistance.
Lula, on the other hand, demonstrates a greater capacity for social interaction. He remains dominant in the Northeast. He maintains his competitiveness in the Southeast. He is gaining support among young people and preserves a significant presence among voters without a rigid ideological identity.
Lulaism continues to be a political language capable of transcending different regions, social classes, and cultural experiences.
But Lula also has significant weaknesses.
His disapproval rating remains extremely high. When the poll asks who the voter "would absolutely not vote for," Lula leads with 46,7%. Flávio Bolsonaro comes in second, with 39,8%.
This reveals that Brazil remains emotionally fragmented. Polarization continues to be organized not only by positive support, but also by intense rejection of the adversary.
This data is of enormous analytical importance. Lula leads the presidential race, but he is not rebuilding national consensus. His challenge will be to broaden his support without further increasing his disapproval rating.
The economy, inflation, the feeling of urban insecurity, and the natural wear and tear of exercising power continue to function as vulnerable areas for the government.
Flávio Bolsonaro faces a different problem. His inner circle is loyal, passionate, and mobilized. However, his candidacy still seems too narrow for a major national election. There is political intensity, but a lack of social dynamism.
The regional dimension reinforces this perception. The Northeast remains a strongly Lula-supporting territory. The South remains Bolsonaro-supporting. The Southeast continues to be the true electoral battleground of the country.
The Brazilian political map remains divided by distinct economic histories, cultural identities, urban experiences, and regional trajectories.
Religion continues to play a decisive role. Among evangelicals, Flávio Bolsonaro maintains a wide lead. Among Catholics, Lula remains dominant.
Contemporary Brazilian politics can no longer be understood solely through the classic logic of left versus right. Religion has become one of the major organizers of national political sensibilities.
Another important piece of data reveals the degree of electoral crystallization in the country. Sixty-two percent of those interviewed stated that they have already decided how they will vote.
Brazil enters 2026 with relatively consolidated positions. Even so, the 38% who admit the possibility of change represent a gigantic contingent capable of altering any scenario.
Among the other names surveyed, Michelle Bolsonaro deserves special attention. In a second-round match against Lula, she reaches 40%.
Her performance reveals that Bolsonarism possesses a strong capacity for the family transfer of political capital. Michelle effectively engages with the evangelical, female, and conservative electorate.
Ronaldo Caiado also emerges as a relevant figure. Even though he is distant from Lula, he maintains a competitive standing for a traditional institutional right wing.
Caiado represents a conservatism linked to agribusiness, public security, and regional federalism. His challenge is to overcome the limitations of an excessively regionalized image.
Romeu Zema is performing reasonably well, but lacks national popular appeal.
Fernando Haddad emerges as a competitive contender against Flávio Bolsonaro, who are practically tied in the second round. This demonstrates that Lulaism may be able to survive electorally beyond Lula's own figure, although without fully reproducing his symbolic power.
Ultimately, the Meio/Ideia survey reveals a Brazil weary of the constant political warfare, yet still trapped within it. It reveals a resilient Lula-ism, less triumphant than in other historical periods, but still robust nationally. It also reveals a vibrant, intense, and mobilized Bolsonaro-ism, but one surrounded by difficulties in its social expansion.
The 2026 election is beginning to take on clearer shape. It will not be just an electoral contest. It will be a conflict between different national experiences, different social memories, and different interpretations of democracy, the state, the economy, and national identity.
Amidst the Brazilian turmoil, the poll numbers leave a clear impression. Lula is competitive because he can still speak beyond his own political bubble. Flávio Bolsonaro is strong, but still excessively dependent on the emotional and ideological limits of Bolsonarism itself. And perhaps that's exactly where the election will begin to be decided.
Paulo Baía is a sociologist, political scientist, essayist, and professor at UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro).
Leave a comment